Preventing the Attack on Pearl Harbor: A Case Study Using the Price-Oquindo Diminishing Terrorism Model (DTM)

Author: Todd M Price MBA, Ph.D.(c). & Price-Oquindo DTM

Introduction

The attack on Pearl Harbor was a turning point in history, yet, with the insights provided by the Price-Oquindo Diminishing Terrorism Model (DTM), historians and analysts can examine how specific interventions might have altered the course of events. By identifying key factors that drove Japan toward conflict, researchers can explore how earlier, more strategic measures might have prevented the attack.

The U.S. had some indications of Japanese aggression before the attack on Pearl Harbor, but the specifics of when and where the attack would occur were not fully anticipated. The U.S. attempted to prevent conflict through diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, and military preparations, though these measures ultimately failed to avert the attack.

Diplomatic Efforts and Economic Sanctions

The U.S. imposed economic sanctions and an oil embargo on Japan in 1941 to curb its military expansion, particularly in China and Southeast Asia. The U.S. believed these actions would pressure Japan to negotiate and potentially avoid war. However, Japan viewed the embargo as a threat to its survival, leading them to plan a preemptive strike against U.S. forces. Despite continued negotiations throughout 1941, the U.S. and Japan failed to reach a peaceful resolution (Smithsonian Magazine, 2024; Britannica, 2024).

Intelligence and Military Preparations

U.S. intelligence had intercepted Japanese communications, but it was not able to provide clear details of an imminent attack on Pearl Harbor. Most U.S. officials and military leaders believed Japan would target U.S. interests in Southeast Asia or the Philippines, not Hawaii. Despite receiving warnings, commanders in Pearl Harbor did not believe the base would be attacked and instead focused on preparing for sabotage rather than a military strike (National WWII Museum, 2024; Smithsonian Magazine, 2024).

Missed Warnings and Misinterpretations

There were several warnings before the attack, including radar detections of incoming aircraft and the sinking of a Japanese submarine near Pearl Harbor. However, these warnings were either misinterpreted or not acted upon quickly enough. The U.S. Navy also lost track of the Japanese carrier fleet in late November, leaving commanders unaware of Japan’s ability to strike so far from home (National WWII Museum, 2024; National Air and Space Museum, 2024).

Conclusion

Although the U.S. took steps to prevent a conflict with Japan through economic sanctions and military preparations, intelligence failures and underestimations of Japan’s capabilities allowed the attack on Pearl Harbor to occur. The attack highlighted gaps in U.S. military readiness and the challenges of interpreting fragmented intelligence (Smithsonian Magazine, 2024; National Air and Space Museum, 2024).

References

• Smithsonian Magazine. (2024). How (Almost) Everyone Failed to Prepare for Pearl Harbor. Retrieved from https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/how-almost-everyone-failed-prepare-pearl-harbor-180976253

• National WWII Museum. (2024). The Three Missed Tactical Warnings That Could Have Made a Difference at Pearl Harbor. Retrieved from https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/missed-warnings-pearl-harbor

• Britannica. (2024). Pearl Harbor Attack. Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/event/Pearl-Harbor-attack

• National Air and Space Museum. (2024). The Complicated Lead Up to Pearl Harbor. Retrieved from https://airandspace.si.edu/stories/editorial/complicated-lead-pearl-harbor

Factors in the Price-Oquindo Model:

1. Socio-Economic Status (SES):

   • Japan was under severe economic strain due to U.S. sanctions and the oil embargo. With a growing need for resources and limited economic alternatives, Japan faced a critical need to secure its resource supply.

   • Estimated Weight (α): 0.25

   • Score: 75 (economic pressure leading to military action)

2. Political Instability (PI):

   • Internally, Japan had a militaristic government that was becoming more aggressive, influenced by the Imperial Japanese Army. Though stable, Japan’s government was driven by a need to expand to maintain power.

   • Estimated Weight (β): 0.20

   • Score: 50 (moderate instability but militaristic)

3. Ideological Extremism (IE):

   • Japan was heavily influenced by a militaristic and imperialistic ideology, justifying expansionism as essential for survival. This ideological commitment to military dominance was a major driver of the attack.

   • Estimated Weight (γ): 0.30

   • Score: 85 (high ideological extremism)

4. Social Disenfranchisement (SD):

   • Japanese society largely supported the war efforts due to nationalistic pride and military propaganda. There was little social disenfranchisement within Japan, as opposition to the regime was weak or suppressed.

   • Estimated Weight (δ): 0.10

   • Score: 20 (low social disenfranchisement)

5. Lack of Education (LE):

   • Japan had a relatively well-educated population, but propaganda and militaristic indoctrination were strong. Educational systems reinforced the government’s expansionist goals.

   • Estimated Weight (ϵ): 0.05

   • Score: 30 (moderate effect due to propaganda)

6. Psychosocial Factors (PSF):

   • The Japanese culture at the time was deeply influenced by notions of honor, loyalty, and sacrifice for the emperor. This made the public more willing to support aggressive military actions.

   • Estimated Weight (ζ): 0.15

   • Score: 80 (strong psychosocial factors favoring aggression)

7. External Influence (EI):

   • Japan was part of the Axis alliance with Germany and Italy. The belief that the U.S. was distracted by European conflicts influenced Japan's decision to strike, believing it could delay U.S. involvement.

   • Estimated Weight (η): 0.15

   • Score: 65 (moderate external influence through alliances)

Calculating the Terrorism Risk Score (T):

The formula for the risk score is:

T=α(SES)+β(PI)+γ(IE)+δ(SD)+ϵ(LE)+ζ(PSF)+η(EI)T = α(SES) + β(PI) + γ(IE) + δ(SD) + ϵ(LE) + ζ(PSF) + η(EI)T=α(SES)+β(PI)+γ(IE)+δ(SD)+ϵ(LE)+ζ(PSF)+η(EI)

Substituting the estimated weights and scores:

T=(0.25×75)+(0.20×50)+(0.30×85)+(0.10×20)+(0.05×30)+(0.15×80)+(0.15×65)T = (0.25 \times 75) + (0.20 \times 50) + (0.30 \times 85) + (0.10 \times 20) + (0.05 \times 30) + (0.15 \times 80) + (0.15 \times 65)T=(0.25×75)+(0.20×50)+(0.30×85)+(0.10×20)+(0.05×30)+(0.15×80)+(0.15×65)T=18.75+10+25.5+2+1.5+12+9.75T = 18.75 + 10 + 25.5 + 2 + 1.5 + 12 + 9.75T=18.75+10+25.5+2+1.5+12+9.75T=79.5T = 79.5T=79.5

Terrorism Risk Score: 79.5

This score suggests a high risk of aggressive or terrorist actions, reflecting the intense socio-political and ideological pressures that led Japan to attack Pearl Harbor. The high scores in Socio-Economic Status, Ideological Extremism, and Psychosocial Factors were key drivers of this aggressive move.

1. To prevent the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. administration of that era could have applied key strategies based on the Price-Oquindo Diminishing Terrorism Model (DTM) by addressing the root causes of the conflict between the U.S. and Japan. Here are some preventative strategies aligned with the DTM framework:

   1. Socio-Economic Status (SES)

   • Strategy: The U.S. could have eased its economic sanctions and oil embargo imposed on Japan, which had significantly strained Japan’s access to critical resources. A diplomatic approach to negotiate new trade agreements might have provided Japan with the resources it needed, reducing its motivation to engage in territorial expansion through military means​​.

   • Intervention: Development of an economic pact or resources-sharing agreement could have addressed Japan's economic struggles, thereby eliminating one of the major incentives for initiating conflict.

   2. Political Instability (PI)

   • Strategy: The U.S. could have strengthened diplomatic relations with non-military factions within Japan to promote peace. By offering political support and engagement to moderate political leaders, the U.S. could have weakened the influence of Japan's militaristic leadership​​.

   • Intervention: Encouraging political reforms that promote stable governance and less reliance on aggressive military policies might have reduced Japan’s need to engage in an aggressive foreign policy.

   3. Ideological Extremism (IE)

   • Strategy: The U.S. could have launched a robust international propaganda campaign that promoted regional cooperation and peace, countering Japan's imperialist and militaristic ideology. Promoting peace through shared cultural and economic partnerships would undermine Japan’s justification for expansion​​.

   • Intervention: A counter-ideology effort, possibly involving allied nations, to encourage narratives of cooperation rather than dominance would have weakened the appeal of militarism within Japan.

   4. Social Disenfranchisement (SD)

   • Strategy: Japan’s military engagement in other countries, particularly China and Korea, could have been targeted by supporting resistance movements and local governance. By stretching Japan’s military resources abroad, its capacity for launching new attacks would have been reduced​​.

   • Intervention: Assistance in strengthening the resistance forces in these territories would have forced Japan to focus more on maintaining its current control rather than expanding into new areas, such as Pearl Harbor.

   5. Lack of Education (LE)

   • Strategy: Longer-term diplomatic relations could have included cultural and educational exchange programs aimed at softening Japan's militaristic culture. By fostering relationships through educational cooperation, the U.S. could have planted the seeds of a more peaceful, cooperative society​​.

   • Intervention: Investment in Japan's education system could have promoted alternative narratives to militaristic expansion, gradually shifting public and elite opinion towards a more peaceful stance.

   6. Psychosocial Factors (PSF)

   • Strategy: Psychological warfare campaigns that emphasized the severe consequences of war could have been used to decrease Japan’s cultural focus on sacrifice and loyalty to military expansion​.

   • Intervention: Highlighting the personal and societal losses associated with war through targeted psychological campaigns might have caused internal unrest and a demand for peace within Japan.

   7. External Influence (EI)

   • Strategy: The U.S. could have worked diplomatically to isolate Japan from its key allies, Germany and Italy. Weakening these alliances would have made Japan less inclined to adopt an aggressive foreign policy​​.

   • Intervention: By forging closer diplomatic relations with neutral countries and encouraging them to distance themselves from Japan, the U.S. could have diminished Japan’s confidence in launching attacks.

   Conclusion

   By addressing the socio-economic pressures, political instability, militaristic ideology, and social conditions fueling Japan’s aggression, the U.S. administration could have taken a multifaceted approach to prevent the attack on Pearl Harbor. These strategies, drawn from the DTM model, emphasize early intervention through diplomacy, economic support, counter-ideology campaigns, and alliance disruptions, thus avoiding direct military confrontation​​.